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RECENT BOOKS 
BRITISH STATUTES IN AMERICAN LAw 1776-1836. By Elizabeth 
Gaspar Brown. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Law School. 
1964. Pp. xiv, 377. $7.50. 
The all-too-short bookshelf on American legal history has been 
expanded slightly in quantity and substantially in quality by this 
unique study. More than thirty years ago, when Professor Morris 
issued "a challenge to American legal scholarship to rescue the law 
of the British colonies in North America from the obscurity in 
which it had long lain"1 with the first edition of his Studies in the 
History of American Law, that edition itself was almost the only 
title to be placed on a reference list for such a project. Between the 
date of his first edition in 1930 and the lectures of Professor Ames on 
legal history (mostly British) in 1913,2 hardly anything had been 
published on the subject, unless one broadens the definition to 
include such related works as Warren's earlier history of the bar 
in America,3 his history of the Supreme Court,4 and biographies such 
as Beveridge's study of John Marshall.6 
In the past three decades, although one could not describe it 
as a mounting flood, the trickle of scholarship in legal history has 
slowly broadened into a credible rivulet, and at least it is flowing 
more strongly. The several volumes of American Legal Records 
published through the Littleton-Griswold Fund of the American 
Historical Association6 will stand comparison with the hallmark 
works of the Selden Society. The original study of Goebel and 
Naughton on criminal procedure in New York Colony7 proved 
to be an invaluable antecedent to Professor Goebel's landmark 
edition of the recently published first volume of Alexander Hamil-
ton's legal papers.8 The prospective publication of the first volume 
of the new Supreme Court History under the auspices of the Oliver 
Wendell Holmes Devise of the Library of Congress and the forth-
coming Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution 
I. MORRIS, STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAw, p. iii (2d ed. 1959). 
2. AMES, LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY AND MISCELLANEOUS LEGAL EssAYS (1913). 
3. WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR (1911). 
4. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY (rev. ed. 1937). 
5. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL (2d ed. 1944). 
6. COUNTY COURT RECORDS OF ACCOMACK-NORTHAMPTON, VIRGINIA 1632-1640 (Ames 
ed. 1954); PROCEEDINGS OF THE MARYLAND COURT OF APPEAIS 1695-1729 (Bond &: Morris 
ed. 1933); COURT REcoRDs OF KENT CouNTY, DELAWARE 1680-1705 (de Valinger ed. 
1959); THE SUPERIOR COURT DIARY OF WILLIAM SAMUEL JOHNSON 1772-1773 (Farrell ed. 
1942); RECORDS OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF SOUTH CAROLINA 1671-1779 (Gregorie 
ed. 1950); SELECT CASES OF THE MAYOR'S COURT OF NEW YORK CITY (Morris ed. 1935); 
THE BURLINGTON COURT BOOK (Reed &: Miller ed. 1944); RECORDS OF THE VICE-ADMIRALTY 
COURT OF RHODE ISLAND 1716-1752 (Towle ed. 1936). 
7. GOEBEL&: NAUGHTON, LAW ENFORCEMENT IN COLONIAL NEW YORK-A STUDY IN 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1944). 
8. THE LAW PRACTICE OF ALExANDER HAMILTON (Goebel ed. 1964). 
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under the auspices of the National Historical Publications Com-
mission9 are also substantial contributions to this long-neglected 
field. 
Historically the American people have had, as one scholar puts 
it, a "highly instrumental attitude toward law," which "reflected the 
depth and spread of change in our development, the pressure of events, 
the preoccupation with economic values and problems and with the 
nearest ends--those which people deemed the most practical."10 
Tpat socio-economic factors fundamentally affected law, especially 
in the context of the frontier, has been skillfully demonstrated by 
Professor Blume in his published work,11 and the pragmatic consid-
erations coloring our constitutional practices have been eloquently 
--as well as controversially-argued by Professors Crosskey and 
Haines.12 Here and there, special studies of environmental or internal 
influences on our legal institutions have also appeared.13 But the 
list, taking all of these together, is still much too short to do justice 
to the many facets of the subject. 
Assuming, although not conceding, that the study of legal 
history has some "practical" usefulness to the contemporary profes-
sion and the modern law curriculum, a case in point is certainly the 
role of the common law in American jurisprudence. The author 
of what is already acknowledged as a modern classic on its subject 
has written: 
"For the long haul, for the large-scale reshaping and growth 
of doctrine and of our legal institutions, I hold the almost 
unnoticed changes to be more significant than the historic key 
cases, the cumulations of the one rivaling and then outweighing 
the crisis-character of the other. If the nature of case law 
growth and adjustment were the subject of the present study 
(as it is not), I should even be arguing with detail and persistence 
that in the main the difference between the great judgments 
which become leading cases and various equally striking judg-
ments (they are so many!) which have sunk into obscurity lies 
largely in the massing around the former of these little "insig-
9. Cf. Dunlap's report on the Supreme Court history, and Cushman's report on the 
Documentary History, respectively, in The Quarterly Legal Historian, March 1963, 
p. ll; and id., March 1962, p. 3. 
10. HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW-THE LAW MAKERS 4 (1950). 
II. TRANSACTIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE TERRITORY OF MICHIGAN, 1805-
1836 (Blume ed. 1935-40); Blume 8: Brown, Territorial Courts and Law, 61 MICH. L. 
R.Ev. 39, 467 (1962-63); Blume, Legislation on the American Frontier, 60 MICH. L. REY. 
lll7 (1962), and related papers cited there. 
12. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 
(1953); HAINES, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GoVERNMENT AND 
PoLmcs, 1789-1835 (2d ed. 1960). 
Ill. HURST, LAW AND THE CoNDmoNs OF FREEDOM IN THE NINEI'EENTH·CENTURY 
UNITED STATES (1956); JACOBS, LAW WRITERS AND THE COURTS (1954); WRIGHT, AMERICAN 
INTERPRETATIONS OF NATURAL LAW (2d ed. 1962). 
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nificant" applications which first built them in and then built 
them up and thereafter built them out into unsuspected range 
and into a strength which never was their own."14 
The fact is that the role of the common law in our history, legal 
and general, has been a tripartite one: The first phase consists of the 
period and the process of "receiving" the English common law into 
the colonies and, in the newly established states, the application of 
English common-law rules of construction and decision. This phase 
continued well into the nineteenth century but has been diminishing 
rather steadily since then. The second phase has been the period 
when native legislation, particularly legislation seeking to divest 
the jurisdiction of certain rules of the common law which had been 
received-e.g., abolition of the Rule in Shelley's Case15-has created 
a new frame of reference for the common-law tradition. We are 
presently in the third phase, in which a new corpus of statutory 
enactments is growing up substantially in derogation of the legislative 
developments of the second phase and of the common law as it 
adapted to the frame of reference established by the second phase.1cs 
From Llewellyn's study we may proceed to the proposition that 
American jurisprudence today is conditioned by the common law 
inherited from the first and second phases thus described and, for 
the most part, has not become generally aware of the third phase.17 
If we must have some pragmatic application for legal history, then 
here is one; for to make each of these three phases of the common law 
in America clearly discernible, we need considerably more research 
on the first two phases.18 And this is what makes Mrs. Brown's work 
of such fundamental significance. It has brought into focus an impor-
tant and hitherto generally unnoticed element in the continuity of 
English common-law institutions in American life-for, in the 
first and second phases which have been suggested above, statutory 
materials were essentially related to the common law either because 
they were declaratory or in derogation thereof. 
British colonial theory-at least in the eighteenth century and 
14. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADmoN-DECIDING .APPEALS 109 (1960). 
15. For specific statutory abolition, cf. ALA. CoDE tit. 47, § 141 (1958); CONN. GEN. 
STAT • .ANN. § 47-4 (1958); D.C. CODE .ANN. § 45-203 (1961); FLA. STAT. § 689.17 (Supp. 
1963); IowA CODE § 557.20 (1950); MD. CODE ANN. art. 93, § 366 (1957); MASS. GEN. 
LA.ws .ANN. ch. 184, § 5 (1955); MINN. STAT. § 500.14 (1945); MISS. CODE ANN. § 835 
(1956); Mo. R.Ev. STAT. § 442.490 (1949); NEB. R.Ev. STAT. § 76-112 (1958); N.H. R.Ev. 
STAT. ANN. § 551.8 (1955); N.J. R.Ev. STAT. § 46:3-14 (1937); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 54; 
N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-04-20 (1960); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 180.16 (1950); s.c. 
CODE ANN. § 57-2 (1962); TENN. CODE ANN. § 64-103 (1955); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-14 
(1959); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3534 (1961); WIS. STAT. § 230.28 (1957). 
16. Cf. Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARv. L. R.Ev. 4 (1936). 
17. Cf. LLEWELLYN, op. cit. supra note 14, app. C. 
18. Cf. the brilliant illustration of the technique in Llewellyn, On Warranty of 
Quality, and Society (pts. 1-2), 36 CoLUM L. R.Ev. 699 (1936) and 37 CoLuM. L. R.Ev. 341 
(1937). 
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possibly throughout the seventeenth-held that acts of Parliament 
did not extend to a British colony unless the act specifically men-
tioned the colony or the colony specifically incorporated the act 
into its own law. Attempts at general incorporation by reference, on 
the part of certain American colonies, were disallowed by the crown; 
and Mrs. Brown's interesting documentation of these instances 
significantly supplements the critical analysis of colonial theories 
of British constitutionalism published by Professor Mcllwain forty 
years ago.19 This being the state of affairs, American colonies, and 
subsequently American states,20 specifically adopted parliamentary 
enactments which offered benefits in many subject-areas (e.g., wills, 
waste, uses), which the Americans sought to enjoy within the context 
of the English common law.21 
Until the history of the common law in the United States was 
well into its second phase and the codification movement had 
gained ground in a number of states, the British statutes continued 
in effect. Unless specifically repealed, in fact, one may presume that 
they continue to the present, and with them, in the absence of con-
trary authority, the guiding precedents of British adjudication. As 
the author states in her preface, the period selected for her study 
(the first sixty years following independence) was selected in the 
interest of unity.22 One may hope that she will ultimately write a 
sequel documenting the survival of particular British statutes in 
American legal systems of the present era. 
With this hope in mind, one is tempted to single out Part III of 
the present volume as the most important and also the most exciting. 
Here, the author has assembled dozens of British statutes, from the 
reissue of Magna Carta, in 9 Hen. 3 (1225), to an act in the first 
year of George III in 1760, with citations of American cases or 
statutes which adopted them.23 A bumper crop of separate research 
projects-with fields white for harvest and laborers distressingly 
few-now can be anticipated from this seedbed. What does this 
study of the survival of British statutes in the formative period of 
American law suggest, for example, as to the true context of the 
American law of wills; or of actions in arrest of judgment or in 
execution thereof; or of bargain and sale, the Uniform Commercial 
Code notwithstanding? 
With this study, we have advanced a measurable distance toward 
the state of readiness necessary to take full advantage of the research 
19, BROWN, BRITISH STATUTES IN AMERICAN LAW 1776-1836, at 1-46 (1964); MCILWAIN, 
THE AMERICAN REvoLUTION: A CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 18-147 (1923); cf. 
SMITH, JAMES WU.SON-FOUNDING FATHER 43-115 (1956). 
20. Cf. VA. ConE ANN.§ 1-11 (1950). 
21. BROWN, op. cit. supra note 19, at 47-200. 
22. Id. at x. 
23. Id. at 201-355. 
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opportunities suggested by Professor Hurst in a paper in 1960: the 
study of reciprocal influences of law and socio-economic factors in 
periods of major national adjustments, e.g., in the Jacksonian era, 
during and after the Civil War, during the "progressive era," and in 
the Great Depression.24 Mrs. Brown's work not only provides a solid 
foundation for such research, but is a major contribution in itself. 
The detailed checklist of British statutes incorporated into American 
state law, which comprises Part III and perhaps one-third of her 
book, is complemented in Part I with the historical background and 
in Part II with a review of the particular method by which the 
statutes were adopted in various jurisdictions (the original colonies, 
the Northwest Territory, the territory south of the Ohio, and the 
Louisiana Territory). 
The role of legislation and legislatures in our history is now 
being re-examined in terms of what Professor Hurst called "the 
inheritance of the legislature"25-the colonial frustrations in efforts 
to secure greater control over local affairs from a distant center of 
the empire, which led the revolutionists to vest in their elected 
representatives a broad authority. As the present study shows, this 
authority was soon exercised, once free of Parliament, to adopt a 
number of parliamentary statutes. The westward movement carried 
the British statutes with it in many instances.26 And these statutes, 
originating in the context of the English common law, maintained 
that common-law tradition (the first phase of our common-law 
history) until the eve of the Civil War. 
The story is indeed a remarkable one; "the use of English statutes 
was provided for at an early stage in twenty-six out of the twenty-
eight jurisdictions organized between 1776 and 1836," writes the 
author. "Thus, the potential break with prior legal developments 
was averted-there was at least as high a continuity in the use of 
English statutes by the several United States jurisdictions as in the 
case of the Canadian provinces and territories during the nineteenth 
century and the emergent African nations of the twentieth century."27 
This is an important pathfinding project which certainly deserves 
the attention of the legal profession. 
William F. Swindler, 
Professor of Law, 
Marshall-Wythe School of Law, 
College of William and Mary 
24. Hurst, The Law in United States History, 104 Paoc. AM. PHILOS. Soc'y 518, 523 
(1960). 
25. HURST, op. dt. supra note IO, at 23-45. 
26. Cf. Blume, supra note 11. 
27. BROWN, op. cit. supra note 19, at 44. 
